Opening the Culture of Peace: Global Civil Society in the Age of FOSS

La apertura de la Cultura de la Paz: La Sociedad Civil Global en la Era de FOSS

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Abstract
This paper begins with an overview of perspectives from peace research on the cultural and social implications of advanced communications technology, especially with a view towards its longer-term and subtler effects, rather than its direct applications in carrying out or responding to situations of organized violent conflict. A tacit consensus is noted in the literature that technology by itself is capable of amplifying the impacts of existing social behaviors—peaceable or not—. The discussion then moves to a focused analysis of FOSS and its related ethical principles, and the collaborative model of transparent peer review through which it is developed. Once these elements of FOSS have been described, the discussion moves in the final section to show how they can be used to revisit and reinvigorate the concept of a culture of peace, and to encourage its development.

Key words
Culture of Peace, organized violence, peaceable, software, communications technology, FOSS.

Resumen
El artículo comienza con una visión general de las perspectivas de investigación sobre la paz y tiene como fin evidenciar las implicaciones culturales y sociales de la tecnología de comunicaciones avanzada, especialmente con miras a largo plazo y sus efectos sutiles, más que sus aplicaciones directas en la realización o la respuesta a las situaciones de violencia organizada. Un consenso tácito se observa en la literatura, donde la tecnología por sí misma es capaz de amplificar el impacto de los comportamientos sociales existentes—“peaceable” o no—. La discusión se mueve entonces a un análisis enfocado de software libre y sus principios éticos relacionados, y el modelo de colaboración de revisión por pares, a través del cual se desarrolla. Una vez que se han descrito estos elementos de software libre, en la última sección se pauta cómo pueden ser usados para revisar y revitalizar el concepto de una cultura de paz, y fomentar su desarrollo.

Palabras clave
Cultura de paz, violencia organizada, peaceable, software, tecnología de comunicaciones, FOSS.
Introduction

On the topic of communications technology and peace, research tends to focus on tactical, responsive applications—technological fixes—which allow for the better analysis of a given situation and the organization of a more rapid social reaction, often the through mobilization of broad sections of the population. This is how I would characterize much of the literature on social media, for example, and its facilitation of popular protest movements. This was also the theme of MIT’s recent conference on the subject—“peace through technology”—which emphasized the use of mobile phones and drones to collect data from conflict/disaster areas, measure impacts of humanitarian interventions, facilitate logistics for peace operations, and so on.

Another way to frame this issue, however, is to look at the more indirect, cultural impacts of communications technology, the subtler effects of which are often overlooked in situations that demand a tightly focused, tactical approach. The idea of this paper is to consider these longer-term, strategic and aspects of peace and technology, grounded in the literature of global citizenship, social learning theory, and the encouragement of cultures of peace.

To this effect, the first section offers a general overview of the discussion among peace researchers on the role of communications technology in global culture, and finds that most scholars have arranged themselves around the position that the technology by itself is ambiguous on which aspects of our culture(s) it promotes. As many have demonstrated, a technology as wide-reaching and complex as the internet, for example, is capable of amplifying many different cultural and countercultural currents, of either a violent or nonviolent nature, and seems to be both connecting us to each other and isolating us from one another on a scale that our species has had little time to adjust to.

The discussion then moves to a focused consideration of the free software and open source movements (FOSS), which have articulated clear principles of freedom, sharing, openness, community engagement, and personal responsibility that correspond in interesting ways to ideas of cosmopolitanism and
civic engagement, and to the discussion of peace culture in general. The suggestion is made that this particular subculture of technology enthusiast’s shares with culture of peace scholars (some of whom are more sceptical of technology in general) a similar epistemology for the importance of positive social change, and similar ideas about the ways in which such changes may be brought about.

Through this discussion, I hope to show how the principles and practices of FOSS can be useful, first of all in reclaiming the concept of a culture of peace—which I suggest could be refreshed and “opened”—and also informing how peace scholarship itself navigates the profound social changes that have been suggested by contemporary communications technology. Significantly, theorists from both groups express the view that we are not mere observers of society but active participants, empowered with the responsibility of embodying the changes we advocate.

**Communication technology and global culture**

“Forced into our unwilling minds has been a view that presents Earth and humanity as a single entity”: Isaac Asimov on the psychological impact of Sputnik I and the dawn of the Space Age (cited in Mueller 1991, VIII).

Peace researchers have approached the interplay of communications technology and culture from many different perspectives, with an overall tone, perhaps, of guarded optimism. At the very least, there is agreement that an increasingly global culture driven by information technology is in fact developing, opening new possibilities for activists, artists, and researchers to find each other, and organize for peace (Miller 2012, Branagan 2013).

There remains significant disagreement, however, about the real costs and benefits of this technology, as well as the extent to which it will contribute in a substantial way to cross cultural understanding and the pacific settlement of disputes. In other words, it is unclear whether greater connectivity itself is contributing to a global culture of peace, or whether it is only
exacerbating the inequalities and insecurities we have historically faced. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon encapsulated this uncertainty when he wrote that “Technology has globalized communications, now we have to globalize compassion and citizenship. In a world that is more connected, we must be more united”.

An early exploration of the relationship between communication and compassion in the field of peace and conflict studies is offered in Robert Mueller’s *The Birth of a Global Civilization* (1991). Mueller welcomes the global telecommunications age with open arms, and presents the interesting view that globalized communications necessarily globalize compassion. This is because, for Mueller, the new networks are simply extensions of older structures of kinship and community, which have compassion built into them on a deep level, inherited from generations of successful and reciprocal models of social behavior. Mueller predicts that the new networks will inherit the functionality of the older social networks, particularly in terms of their ability to discourage anti-social or dishonest forms of social interaction within the group and, in a certain sense, self-correct (p. 90). From this point of view, human technology will necessarily facilitate a fundamentally “human” exchange of thoughts and feelings, giving each individual a sense of place and purpose in the larger community (p. 86, 90-92).

For Mueller, the lack of this kind of direct communication through an inclusive human network has been largely responsible for the problem of war, which has fomented in an international context of isolated and misinformed communities, each of which is easily manipulated for the selfish interests of those who profit from war politically and/or economically. This is one of the reasons that Mueller put such faith in the United Nations system, especially its mechanisms for cultural and social exchange. Mueller completes the argument with the idea that the unacceptable costs and inability of war to solve the problems of humanity are simple truths that will only become more clear as people interact directly with each other, instead of going through the “big powers, media and monopolies” (p. 92) who create and benefit from hostilities within and between societies. Networking, Mueller tells us in his poem on the subject,
will be “the new freedom/ The new democracy/ A new form of happiness” (p. 92).

A similar, if more nuanced and measured point is made by Dr. Peter Katzenstein in a 2012 lecture entitled “Civilizations in World Politics”, with specific reference to “East” and “West”. The “traditional” idea that these are two discrete cultural entities, Katzenstein argues, is little more than a politically convenient fabrication that has been significantly deteriorated by increased access to technology and travel. The idea of a coming inter-civilizational violent conflict, for which some would suggest we should prepare militarily, has therefore become harder to maintain.

For Katzenstein, the fundamental congruence and connectedness of East and West, and all human civilization for that matter, is simply becoming harder to deny. A specific technology he points to is translation software, the inevitable improvement of which will continue to have profound implications for cross-cultural communication, the enjoyment and appreciation of foreign cultures, and many aspects of travel and diplomacy.

The majority of peace researchers, however, seem to hold more reservations about enthusiastically embracing communications technology as a harbinger of peace, especially when we are looking at the full process of how technology is made and used, and the social turbulence generated as we transition into a fully digitized information society. Certainly, there are a great many reasons to justify their scepticism, some of which I will briefly outline below.

To begin with, the open sharing of information has been resisted by virtually all of the established social structures—from corporations, governments, and universities to religious organizations and associations—as it challenges deeply rooted concepts of loyalty and belonging. Those who have tested the taboos around sharing information traditionally controlled by such structures have been harshly ostracized and faced disproportionate punishment, often as an example to others. This is the case of Aaron Schwartz, whose activism for internet freedom, and particularly his bulk accessing of academic articles from JSTOR, provoked such an extreme response from the US legal system that it ultimately led him to take his own
life, as portrayed in the documentary *The Internet's Own Boy*. While it would be unfair to reduce a person’s entire social experience to this dynamic of institutional resistance to social change, many have found in Schwartz a reflection of their own experience, one of welcoming the positive changes that may come with greater technological capacities, only to find themselves up against what can feel like a reactionary and uncaring institutional establishment.

There are also a great many ways in which the use of computers and mobile phones empowers the traditional establishment, including authoritarian regimes, as they have been given unprecedented access to the private lives of their own citizens, and the ability to monitor social behaviors and movements on a broad scale in order to identify and respond to, or even pre-empt perceived threats. This has become a very real Orwellian phenomenon that carries enormous implications for freedoms of thought and conscience, especially for social activists, many of whom are also peace advocates.

This discussion is elaborated in great detail by Evgeny Morozov in *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*, with specific reference to the ways in which these technologies have been used in what he calls “unfree” societies. Morozov also brings much deserved scrutiny to the typical “success” stories of internet activism, such as the Iranian protests of 2009, which were actually unsuccessful in their goal of liberalizing the regime, despite the hopes and hype of politicians and journalists in the US and UK (p. 1-4). “While it may be true that new forms of activism are emerging,” writes Morozov, “they may be eroding rather than augmenting older, more effective forms of activism and organizing” (2011: 203). One level of this analysis is that internet activism often takes on a superficial form – what Morozov calls “slacktivism” (*idem*). This echoes the sentiments of many other scholars, some of whom will be discussed below, who similarly worry that online campaigns will be unable of forging and supporting the kinds of long term and responsive social relationships that have been at the core of previous social movements.

Another level of concern is that governments and corporations have an interest in encouraging the digitization of activism and social
struggle, where information can be easily analyzed, manipulated, and misdirected. Of course, even before the NSA's prism program was exposed to the US press, and the world, by Edward Snowden, there was concern that the governments of "free" societies, as well as corporations or even hostile individuals, were also using communications technology to gain access to the private lives of citizens for various unsavory purposes. Jacob Applebaum helped develop the “Tor anonymity network partly for these reasons” (Zahorsky 2011) —although, as the developers themselves make clear, it is exceedingly difficult to maintain personal privacy online, even while using such anonymity tools—. As Applebaum explains, internet anonymity can be used for a wide range of activities, such as circumventing local attempts to block access to the internet (as was the case in Egypt in 2011), carrying out sensitive human rights work, police work, journalism, financial transactions, etc. The fact that many are now seeking to reclaim some anonymity in their regular communication, and not just in special circumstances —or have given up on privacy altogether— gives some indication of how far things have gone.

The impact of government spying and corporate profiling on the culture at large has had many unquestionably negative impacts, including the increase of both the paranoia and the likelihood that personal information may be used against individual users, and a decrease in the perceived legitimacy of established social institutions.

A good example of this is the controversy around the South Korean government's complicity in spreading heavily biased and partisan views during the 2013 presidential campaign in an effort to influence voting behavior. In effect, elements of the South Korean security establishment created hundreds of false accounts on blogs, news websites, and social media utilities to post thousands of misleading comments in a concerted effort to influence public opinion and the outcome of a national election. The sheer scale and tenacity of this campaign to seemingly defraud the electorate, as well as the manner in which the controversy has been handled by the current administration, have left many citizens feeling that their
democratic rights and freedoms have been violated in a deeply disturbing way.

Another concern that has been raised — and this speaks to the question of “if” the communications technology we have is actually capable of contributing to greater human understanding — is the technological experience itself. Compared to direct human interaction, which generally uses all or at least most of our senses, interaction in cyberspace is significantly restricted and relies heavily on visual representations of information.

This is a concern that Boulding (2000) raised early on in the debate, who characterized interactions in high technology cultures as a kind of “sensorial deprivation”. The point continues to be relevant despite improvements in the design and functionality of our devices. Our bodies and our cultures have developed for direct human-human and human-nature interactions. Now that many of us are interacting with and learning from machines, or via machines, there is some concern that we may be losing some of the social skills that have built up over generations. As Boulding (2000: 223) puts it:

“What is happening is a great de-skilling: a de-skilling of the ability to engage in relationships with other humans, a de-skilling of the ability to interact with the planet itself. Online communication does not carry the cues of human feelings that can be read in facial expressions and body language [...]”

People are learning to live in two-dimensional rather than multi-dimensional realities, and “virtual reality” is the most isolating reality of all.

This is perhaps not as devastating a critique as it may seem when taken out of the context of Boulding’s main argument, which is not to deny the potential value of cyberspace itself, but to advocate for a healthy balance between the many dimensions of communications — with oneself, with one’s immediate environment (both social and natural), with larger civic institutions, and with online communities— (2000: 223). The danger is that if we overvalue virtual relationships, we may end up undervaluing the sometimes difficult but deeply rewarding process of making and maintaining
non-virtual relationships. It is, after all, on the basis of these non-virtual relationships that civic culture has historically developed, and its failure to transfer into the realm of virtual reality (as Morozov’s concern with “slactivism” might suggest) would be an unacceptable tragedy.

There are some interesting counterpoints to this possibility, such as Jeremy Rifkin’s (2010) example of the visceral, global reaction to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, which he ascribes to the immediacy and diversity (photos, videos, first-hand accounts) of the information as it came out, in almost real time, over the internet. This would imply the development of a “sensitive” collective consciousness through technology that really is capable of “feeling” —although, if we continue to study the case of Haiti, we may also find that it is easily capable of forgetting as well—.

There are also many cases of online communities facilitating “real” human interaction, such as couch surfing and meet up, although these relationships could be characterized as generally short lived and non-committal.

The point about technology disconnecting us from the biosphere, however, is not easily counterpointed. Indeed, the Achilles’ heel of the global communications system we are building may be its hardware, which continues to produce unacceptable amounts of e-waste, much of it toxic, and requires significant resources to manufacture and maintain.

The impact on the environment is conspicuously absent from much of the literature, but does receive some attention in Branagan’s (2013) treatment of the drawbacks and benefits of ICT for environmental and social networking and activism. Branagan writes:

“The rapid obsolescence of computers (some of this probably deliberate [...]) is contributing to toxic landfill problems, particularly in less developed countries where they are often dumped. Mining the rare earths on which computers and mobiles rely also has deleterious environmental consequences, while there are health issues related to mobile phone use and transmission
towers. Widespread computer use also consumes a great deal of power” (2013: 151).

Even for Branagan, however, the major concerns are social. These include some of the arguments raised by Morozov, such as the censorship and misuse of information in restricted political contexts, but lead to broader questions of social justice, such as the “digital divide” that automatically excludes vast numbers of people from participating at all, often due to socio-economic status and lack of opportunity (p. 148).

Culturally speaking, Branagan flags one of the most interesting arguments related to the globalization of communications technology, which is its simultaneous globalization of a kind of entertainment culture, reflected in the tendency of most internet users to visit websites and search for terms that have very little to do with “serious political issues” (p. 149). Of course, those who do seek out political topics online will find such a large volume of information that they may suffer from a kind of overload or early burnout, which is a phenomenon also discussed in Branagan.

The general pattern of the research discussed so far —despite the often divergent perspectives of the authors— is to look at the entire system of digital communications as a single unit of analysis, and then to identify its various positive and negative impacts on society. While I agree with the value of taking this kind of broad view of social phenomena, especially one with such far reaching social consequences, I will suggest here that we recognize an important distinction within communications technology: the difference between free and open source software (FOSS), and closed source or proprietary software.

A focused analysis of FOSS contributes to this discussion in several ways, as the following sections will demonstrate. This includes providing peace research with a particular set of ethical principles to consider as we continue to investigate the relationship between technology and culture, as well as a practical model for collective problem solving and creative collaboration, based on a transparent and distributed method of peer review. Once these elements of FOSS have been described, I move in the final section to show how they
can be used to revisit and reinvigorate the concept of a culture of peace, and to encourage its development.

**Free and Open Source Software**

There was a time, in the early stages of computer software development, when the engineers and computer scientists working on various projects freely shared the source code of the programs they wrote with one another, and in doing so, learned from each other, improved each other’s work, and for better or worse, established the foundations of the digital age we have been discussing. The artificial intelligence lab at MIT was one place where this subculture of open collaboration continued into the 1970s, although here too, the influence of business administrators and corporate technology manufacturers eventually began to impose itself through “terms of use” on software, restricting the ability of users to modify, share, or even access the source code of particular programs, even for personal or educational purposes.

The young Richard Stallman, who would later begin the GNU project and found the Free Software Foundation, was deeply concerned by these software restrictions and the values they represented, as they began to be felt within the group working at MIT in the early 1980s, of which he was a part. For Stallman, the problem wasn’t simply the frustration of not being able to modify and personalize software — what Eric Raymond calls “scratching your own itch” — but rather the deeper, social issue of limiting the freedom of people to access, study, modify, and share information of such high social importance.

*Free Software, Free Society* (2002) is a collection of Stallman’s writings, presentations, and interviews from the decade or so leading up to its publication. The definition of free software is repeated several times — that is “free” as in “freedom”, not “free beer” — (p. 46) and itemized according to the following four points (p. 20):

[0] You have the freedom to run the program, for any purpose.
[1] You have the freedom to modify the program to suit your needs. (To make this freedom effective in practice, you must have access to the source code, since making changes in a program without having the source code is exceedingly difficult.)

[2] You have the freedom to redistribute copies, either gratis or for a fee.

[3] You have the freedom to distribute modified versions of the program, so that the community can benefit from your improvements.

The primary consideration for Stallman in the assertion and defense of these freedoms, is the principle of ethical behavior that respects both personal freedoms and the public good. For example, while elaborating on the freedom to redistribute software, Stallman writes:

“Now, for beings that can think and learn, sharing useful knowledge is a fundamental act of friendship. When these beings use computers, this act of friendship takes the form of sharing software. Friends share with each other. Friends help each other. This is the nature of friendship. And, in fact, this spirit of goodwill—the spirit of helping your neighbor, voluntarily—is society’s most important resource. [...] Its importance has been recognized by the world’s major religions for thousands of years, and they explicitly try to encourage this attitude. [...] The society was set up to teach this spirit of cooperation. And why do you have to do that? Because people are not totally cooperative. That’s one part of human nature, and there are other parts of human nature. There are lots of parts of human nature. So, if you want a better society, you’ve got to work to encourage the spirit of sharing.” (p. 166-167).

This idea resonates deeply with Boulding’s (2000) descriptions of peaceful behaviors in different societies, both in its celebration of reciprocity and generosity as social goods, and in its recognition that such behaviors can (and should) be taught and encouraged by
society. In other words, there is an epistemological as well as an ethical congruence in the respective works of Boulding and Stallman – a relationship that warrants further investigation. For now, however, the point is to draw attention to Stallman’s principles for software freedom both on their own, and as an application the “spirit of goodwill”.

Lawrence Lessig, founding board member of the creative commons, further illustrates the social importance of these freedoms with the telling example of “code as law”. Essentially, Lessig (2005) proposes a concept of “free culture” in which software, and similar information systems of general social value, are subjected to the same kind of public oversight and regulation that we should demand of law:

“We could imagine a legal practice that was different-briefs and arguments that were kept secret; rulings that announced a result but not the reasoning. Laws that were kept by the police but published to no one else. Regulation that operated without explaining its rule.

We could imagine this society, but we could not imagine calling it ‘free’.”

Whether or not the incentives in such a society would be better or more efficiently allocated, such a society could not be known as free. The ideals of freedom, of life within a free society, demand more than efficient application. Instead, openness and transparency are the constraints within which a legal system gets built, not options to be added if convenient to the leaders. Life governed by software code should be no less.

I will point out again here that for Stallman and Lessig, and many others who advocate for “free software”, the emphasis is always on ethical principles and social good first, while other aspects such as efficiency, convenience, and even quality, are secondary. It is interesting to point out that both of these theorists have gone on to advocate for greater civil freedoms in other aspects of society as well, mainly within the legal and political context of the United
States, but especially for Stallman, in the wider global culture as well.

There is another perspective related to FOSS which effectively reverses the priorities of Stallman and Lessig, in order to highlight another aspect of the phenomenon of free software: the surprising fact that its products are often of remarkable quality, easily competitive to commercial alternatives. This perspective is often called the “open source” movement.

To illustrate this difference, consider the mission statement of the open source initiative, found on the organization's homepage, which reads as follows:

Open source is a development method for software that harnesses the power of distributed peer review and transparency of process. The promise of open source is better quality, higher reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, and an end to predatory vendor lock-in.

The emphasis here is on the mechanism of peer review and the value of transparency in the efficient creation of quality work and the solution of problems first, while ideological principles related to user freedoms and public good are secondary. This reframing of the issues took place in the context of the dot com bubble of the late 1990s and the attempt to bring free software into the entrepreneurial mainstream and attracting investment.

The recognition that free software was using a different and powerful “development model”, and offered a methodology that could potentially be applied to other instances of collaborative problem solving was made by Eric Raymond in his 1997 paper “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”. Raymond characterizes a “cathedral” approach as one of hierarchy and privacy (if not outright secrecy). Applied to software development, this would describe a relatively small group of engineers, working on a tightly controlled project for a relatively long time in order to catch as many bugs as possible before making a public release. From this perspective, Raymond points out, bugs, or problems in general are seen as “tricky, insidious, deep phenomena” (p. 9). The “bazaar” approach, by contrast, would involve the early and frequent release of code,
allowing the public to find workarounds to known issues, report bugs, and even add features or otherwise assist in the development of the program for any number of reasons. Interestingly, from this point of view, bugs and other development problems are “shallow” (p. 9), easily fixable, and generally less damaging to pride and reputation.

In other words, the open source methodology described by Raymond, and later refined by the Open Source Initiative, encourages developers to publish their work openly, invite peer review, and enjoy the benefits of an improved product. Unfortunately, as scholars such as Benjamin Hill (2013) have pointed out, the dot com bubble did burst, and the attempt to show the efficiency and profitability of this approach has had mixed results in commercial contexts. However, as Hill also suggests, there are still a great many intrinsic benefits to this form of software development for driving innovation and creativity in non-commercial contexts.

As anyone familiar with this debate is well aware, the free software vs. open source argument can be bitter and polarizing, and at the moment, language of “free software” seems to be more attractive than “open source”. However, there are many benefits from the methodology of creating free software through transparent, voluntary collaboration that could be missed if we focused exclusively on the principles of freedom and ethical responsibility. Indeed it is their combination that I find to be most compelling, hence my use of the term FOSS, and the most useful for informing peace research and the strategy of those seeking to encourage peaceable social change.

**Collaborating on superordinate goals**

The combination of ethical principles and transparent practices behind FOSS, as well as the basic fact that free software gives users the ability to control their computer systems, rather than a private company, has led to its widespread adoption by governments, universities, scientific organizations, NGOs, and non-profits.
According to the Wikipedia page on Linux adoption, for example, these include Czech Post, La Universidad de Ciencias Informáticas (Cuba), France's national police, South Africa's Social Security Agency, The Philippines' national voting system (2010), the “Canaimita” laptops given to all Venezuelan students, the entire Brazilian education system, the International Space Station, CERN, the Internet Archive, and many more, such as the London Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, US Navy, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.

As is the nature of FOSS, most of these “users” are also contributors in different ways, which opens an interesting potential for collaboration across lines of political and/or economic rivalry.

The remarkable diversity of organizations using FOSS is a phenomenon of its own, and is directly related to the freedom principles of FOSS, further clarified by points 5 and 6 of the “Open Source Definition”, which explicitly prohibit discrimination against “any persons or groups”, or any “field of endeavor”. The example given in the documentary Revolution OS by Bruce Perens, author of the Open Source Definition, is that open source software cannot be withheld from either an abortion clinic or an anti-abortion organization. While this may generate some uncomfortable ethical dilemmas for peace activists looking to apply tactical pressure to specific groups, it is fundamentally in line with the larger, strategic approach to peace culture that encourages dialogue and collaboration across lines of hostility in order to depolarize and deescalate social tensions.

This was David Adams' (2003) original idea for promoting a culture of peace in El Salvador in the early 1990s, for example, which sought to bring together members from warring factions of a bitter civil war to work together on long term projects of mutual benefit through what Adams describes as “cross conflict participation” (p 6). These included collaborative efforts to improve literacy and citizenship education across the divided lines of the population.

It strikes me as a positive development, for example, that young computer programmers from DPRK have used FOSS to create Red Star OS, a GNU/Linux distribution using many of the educational
and productivity-focused programmers that many of us would recognize. While there are limitations with Red Star OS, such as the modified Firefox browser designed to access the country's internal network rather than the full internet, it has already opened a line of communication with the rest of the FOSS community based on collaboration for the development of practical tools. DPRK programmers have access to source code that they can study and develop to apply to the needs of their own society, and the wider community of programmers, in turn, learn from their innovations—which, at this point, seem to be primarily focused on security features—.

In a political context as polarized and highly escalated as the position of DPRK in international relations, the establishment of transnational communication on the basis of mutual interest and respect, should be considered at least a step in the direction toward a global culture of peace.

**Opening the Culture of Peace**

The phrase “culture of peace”—like its component concepts—is capable of supporting a wide range of valid but potentially contradictory interpretations.\(^1\) Adherents of virtually any culture can (and often do) legitimately claim that it is peaceful, based on the peaceful elements within it, even while other aspects of the culture happen to be involved in violent conflict. This insight informs the basic premise of Boulding’s *Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History*, in which we are reminded that conflicts do not inevitably or even usually lead to violence, but are more often negotiated and resolved in deference to the forces of social responsiveness and nurturance “without which no society could function” (2000: 89).

To borrow some language from FOSS advocates, Lessig might be tempted to identify this body of cultural practices as part of a creative commons, while Raymond might think of the process that

\(^1\) For a detailed discussion on the various interpretations of “peace”, see: Dietrich 2012.
produced it as a kind of bazaar. What we have here in any case is a very diverse set of behaviors, practices, and skills that our ancestors built up over generations and handed down to us through all of our different cultures. These involve techniques of social engagement through play, humor, posture, celebration, grief, worship, romance, and so much more. When they are encouraged and shared openly, these common, peaceable aspects of culture may provide a basis for imagining a “culture of peace” of a loftier, more ambitious interpretation—a culture that rejects war outright, or is, in its essence, incapable of producing war—.

This is closer to the ideal of a culture of peace put forward by UNESCO and later adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/53/243), which gave us the International Year for Culture of Peace (2000), and the Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence for the Children of the World (2000-2010). While these were very noble and important efforts, it is important to recognize that they have had relatively limited success. The goal of the rest of this discussion is to analyze why that may be, and to suggest how the idea of a culture of peace could be refreshed, and in some sense returned to its original, more open meaning.

The background of the culture of peace concept as we know it today is in the recognition that the political and economic institutions that emerged in the aftermath of the second world war had to be matched (and to some extent counterbalanced) by a third sector composed of the global community at large—a global civil society—. This originally took the form of international religious associations and interfaith communities, scientific and educational associations, and others who had a long history of internationalism, and eventually included groups related to the peace movement, the women movement, and the environmental movement. The development of this overlapping pattern of community based organizations, concerned citizens, and social activists into a global civic culture was recognized and encouraged early on by many of the theorists discussed in the section above, including Elise Bouling (1988) and Robert Mueller (1991).
Partly because of the comparatively fragmented communications environment of the time, and partly because of the heavy inheritance of European social structures, these associations and movements initially organized themselves into institutions, within and parallel to UN bodies and large international NGOs. To use Raymond’s imagery, these structures looked and acted a lot like cathedrals, with a distinctly professional and bureaucratic institutional style, perfect for career civil servants. Bouling (1988, p 73) writes, for example:

“The cultivation of an international environment where members of one society care about those of another and want good things for them is not a mysterious or mystical process. At the interpersonal level, competence and skill are important ingredients in altruism [...]”

Whiz is needed for these caring, altruistic people to exercise their skills at the international level is to know the channels we have been discussing in this book, to know the roles open to them. There is already a community of such altruistic internationalists among those who carry out intergovernmental, UN, and INGO activities.

While it is still true that competent, caring people can have a positive impact on the international system, the limitations of the institutional structures themselves have become increasingly clear over time. Often, they get in the way of fulfilling’s their own goals. This is particularly true for the peace and women movements, which demand a higher level of flexibility, responsiveness to individual circumstances and experiences, and non-hierarchical, horizontal models of leadership than most existing institutions can provide. A non-hierarchal movement defeats its own purpose as soon as it organizes itself into a hierarchy.

*The Early History of the Culture of Peace* (2003), written by David Adams as a personal memoire, illustrates many of the struggles he witnessed (along with some significant successes), as originally fluid ideas for a culture of peace were subjected to bureaucratic

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2 Adams (2003: 3) writes that the original philosophy was "channeling the energies of peoples into a common struggle which would benefit everyone."
compromise and rigidity. This began almost immediately, as UNESCO's executive board in 1992 received the initial proposal with significant dissent, but nevertheless voted to maintain the project exclusively within UNESCO, despite the logistical and budgetary limitations that would imply (Adams 2003: 4). This led to increasing tension between the Director-General and some members of the Board (p. 5), over disagreements in methods for promoting peace culture between different member countries (p. 5), as well as turbulent early attempts to reach out to the UN in New York, including a "disastrous" round table, which failed partly due to circumstance and partly to personal offenses taken in response to perceived irregularities in diplomatic protocol (p. 7). The memoire continues to describe a great many more disagreements about who should have power over what, where funding should come from, and how things should be phrased in official documents.

Another point of significant tension developed between the Paris offices of UNESCO and the various field offices, which felt underappreciated and marginalized within the structure. Adams writes that by 1996, it was clear that the national programmed would fail (p. 10). While Adams emphasizes the lack of political will and international funding as root causes, it is almost certainly the case that inherent structural limitations and imbalances were also involved.

Despite all of these challenges, the programmer was eventually supported by a broad group of organizations—including the International Peace Research Association—and the United Nations General Assembly itself, through the Declaration and Programed of Action on a Culture of Peace (A/RES/53/243). This milestone document provides the following itemized and notably politicized definition:

Article 1
A culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behavior and ways of life based on:
(a) Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation;
(b) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

(c) Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(d) Commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts;

(e) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations;

(f) Respect for and promotion of the right to development;

(g) Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men;

(h) Respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information;

(i) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations; and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace.

Item (h) in the above definition is of particular interest to the present discussion, and corresponds to point 15 in the associated Program of Action on a Culture of Peace, in section B of the same document, which reads as follows:

Actions to support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge:

(a) Support the important role of the media in the promotion of a culture of peace;

(b) Ensure freedom of the press and freedom of information and communication;

(c) Make effective use of the media for advocacy and dissemination of information on a culture of peace involving, as appropriate, the United Nations and relevant regional, national and local mechanisms;

(d) Promote mass communication that enables communities to express their needs and participate in decision-making;
(e) Take measures to address the issue of violence in the media, including new communication technologies, inter alia, the Internet; (f) Increase efforts to promote the sharing of information on new information technologies, including the Internet.

From the perspective of Free and Open Source Software, both item (h) in the definition of “a culture of peace” and point 15 in the programed of action hold some vague promise for a “free flow of information”, but are unfortunately confused by being lumped together with so many other issues, such as traditional press freedoms. Also, the issue of information freedom is addressed here alongside what could be interpreted as calls for greater regulation and possibly even censorship, particularly point 15 item (e). And perhaps most importantly for this discussion, there is no clear statement regarding software whatsoever.

Timing certainly must have played a role in this oversight, as the authors of A/RES/53/243 were most likely unaware that software would become such an important part of how an advanced information society would function. However, Adams' memoire suggests that there was also institutional resistance to the kind of open exchange of information that were supported by the technology of the time. For example, Adams and his colleagues' efforts to develop “moderated” systems of information exchange through paired webpages (one limited to members and one public) seem to have been undervalued (p. 32, 33). Although there is an unfortunate mention of a funding proposal to Microsoft—which was, at the time, actively working to stifle FOSS and monopolize control over software in general—the “moderated” systems he describes may have eventually developed into a fully open model of collaborative information exchange, such as Wikipedia. However, it appears as though UNESCO and related institutional backers of the cultural of peace programed sought to use the early internet to “disseminate” information about their own ideas and programmers, rather than facilitate the kind of user-generated exchange of ideas on a culture of peace that Adams' vision may have led to.
Again, Raymond's image of the cathedral comes to mind. And interestingly, James Page's 2001 paper *The International Year for the Culture of Peace: Was it Worthwhile?* Draws attention to the related “tendency to become rhetorical and even sermonic in dealing with the notion of a culture of peace” (p. 349). This is the first of the “challenges” that Page identifies for the culture of peace movement; the second being that the UN system itself, ended up offering only “rhetoric and pronouncements” rather than “modelling” the concept in “daily interactions, as well as in the global context of interaction between nation-states” (p. 349). The last challenge Page identifies — that the emphasis is on individual rather than structural change — is also somewhat relevant to the discussion here, although it raises a more revolutionary point related to “the massive inequalities of global capitalism” (p. 349), that is somewhat beyond the scope of this paper.

Another corresponding critique of the style in which the culture of peace has been institutionalized, surprisingly, comes from Anwarul Chowdhury, former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations and chair of the negotiations to adopt A/RES/53/243, although you have to read between the lines of his 2010 reflection on the International Year for a Culture of Peace, as the overall tone is understandably positive, though certainly short of triumphant. After calling on governments and civil society to come together again and further the programmer for a culture of peace, Chowdhury reminds us again, as he has several times, that the real meaning of peace is still beyond the scope of any institution: “The seeds of peace exist in all of us, and they must be nurtured by all of us — individually and collectively — so that they flourish. Peace cannot be imposed from outside; it must be generated from within.” The implication of all this is just to point out that the concept of “a culture of peace” was originally and still is quite beyond the scope of the noble definition “solemnly proclaimed” by the United Nations General Assembly in 1999. This point is clarified by the example of FOSS, which — despite its many flaws — presents a model of open, collaborative problem solving based on clear ethical principles that respect personal freedoms. The fact that FOSS so easily fits Boulding’s (2000) description of cultures of peace based on
everyday kindnesses such as sharing, and Adams' (2003) original concept of collaborative engagement, even across enemy lines, but does not easily fit with the official UN definition, suggests that the latter is in need of update and review.

One way to do this would be to take the example of FOSS not just as a conceptual model of principled civic behavior that informs the idea of a culture of peace, but also as a practical method to embody and encourage its realization. By consciously shifting our practice towards something like Raymond's bazaar, it may be possible for those of us interested in helping to bring about peaceful cultural changes to meet at least two and maybe even all three of Page's "challenges”.

A key element shared in common by peace scholars and FOSS advocates is a recognition of the power of personal participation. In many ways, culture itself is very much like communications technology — it is a complex system that we have invented, capable of amplifying whatever energy we put into it. It is therefore of little help to stand aside and wait to see which direction the currents of culture and technology will take us—. Rather, as many have said before, in many different ways, we have to participate. We have to recognize the promise of peace that we all have within us, and share it.
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