


Sticky paradigms in Social Science: The role of emotion and ego in the case of economics

Arraigados Paradigmas en las Ciencias Sociales: El papel de la emoción y el ego en la Economía

Recibido: Septiembre 04 de 2013 **Aprobado:** Diciembre 20 de 2013

HANNA SAMIR KASSAB *

WENYUAN WU **

 * Ph.D. Candidate of International Studies at the University of Miami. He was born in Lebanon, raised in St. Kitts and Nevis in the West Indies and studied for seven years at York University in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. There he attained two Bachelors of Arts with Honors degrees in Political Science and History. He also holds a Masters of Arts degree in Political Science with a minor in Liberal Political Philosophy from McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. He has volunteered for a number of non-profit organizations as a journalist, researcher and activist and, has worked as a customer service agent in several industries. His interests include International Relations Theory, National Security, politics of the Far-right and Nationalism, acts of Political Suicide, and Foreign Policy. h.kassab@umiami.edu

** Ph.D. student in International Studies and Research Fellow for Center of Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. She was born and raised in southeast China, received college education in southwest China, and has furthered her graduate-level studies in the U.S. since 2009. Currently, she holds two Bachelors of Science degrees in Economics and International Trade from Southwest Jiaotong University, China. She also holds a Master of Arts degree in International Studies from the University of Miami, Florida, USA. She has interned for several banks and international trade companies as a business analyst, and an assistant manager and worked as an accountant in the retail industry. Her research interests include Corporate Social Responsibility, Financial Crisis, International Financial Regime(s), and China-Latin American Relationship. University of Miami, International Studies. w.wu3@miami.edu

The intellectual was rejected and persecuted at the precise moment when the facts became incontrovertible, when it was forbidden to say that the emperor had no clothes.

-Michel Foucault

ABSTRACT

Do paradigms in social science shift as swiftly as do many in natural science? This article surveys the evolution of economics as an example of how paradigms shift and interact in social science. Through comparative historical analysis of economic theories, psychoanalysis, and theoretical reflection, it submits that academic progress in social science has normative underpinnings that interfere with paradigm shifts. We coin the term “Sticky Paradigms” to explain the combination of emotional normative framework and reason. This paper will first conduct a review of different schools of thoughts in economics to examine if its intellectual history fits the standard of paradigm shifts. Second, we analyze how emotion and reason can work together to produce intellectualism. Third, we elaborate our conceptualization of “Sticky Paradigms”. We conclude with a discussion on the Hegelian dialectic, treating paradigms as competing myths rather than a pragmatic theoretical competition.

KEY WORDS

Paradigm Shift, Sticky Paradigms, Economics, Emotions, Hegelian Dialectic.

RESUMEN

Existen más cambios constantes y marcados en fragmentos cortos de tiempo en las Ciencias Sociales que en las Ciencias Naturales? En este artículo se examina la evolución de la economía, ejemplificando cómo los paradigmas cambian e interactúan en las Ciencias Sociales. A través del análisis histórico comparativo de las teorías económicas, el psicoanálisis y la reflexión teórica, se sostiene que el progreso académico en las Ciencias Sociales tiene fundamentos normativos que interfieren con los cambios de paradigma. Con ello, se atribuye el término “Sticky Paradigms” para explicar la combinación del marco normativo emocional y la razón. Es como este documento pretende realizar en primer lugar una revisión de las diferentes escuelas de pensamiento en economía, con el fin de examinar si su historia intelectual se ajusta a la norma de los cambios de paradigma. En segundo lugar, se analiza cómo la emoción y la razón pueden trabajar conjuntamente para producir el intelectualismo. En tercer lugar, se elabora una conceptualización de “Sticky Paradigms”. Y por último, se concluye con una discusión sobre la dialéctica hegeliana, y el tratamiento de los paradigmas como mitos que concurren en un concurso teórico pragmático.

PALABRAS CLAVES

Cambio de paradigma, paradigmas reiterados, economía, emociones, dialéctica hegeliana



INTRODUCTION

A paradigm embodies theories, principles and research topics as a set of practices dominant in a discipline. Do paradigms shift? Specifically, do paradigms in the social sciences shift as swiftly as do many in the natural sciences? In physics, for example, Einsteinian relativity replaced Newtonian physics in the early 20th century, resulting in a rapid transformation of worldview in the discipline. In social science, how do we characterize the relationship between succeeding or competing paradigms? Which factors account for possible paradigmatic structures in social science? We hypothesize that emotional attachments frustrate smooth and rapid paradigm shifts within social science as academics have normative underpinnings, defined by emotion, that interfere with their work. From this, we argue that intellectualism in social science is the product of both emotional normative frameworks and reason. More specifically, in a psychoanalytic sense, the ego of the intellectual plays a role in a paradigm's longevity. Being dominant over other competitors brings pleasure to some and pain to others, causing a digging in of perspectives. This is because of the defense mechanisms that are manufactured by the ego, deep within the intellectuals' psyche. These two features create sticky paradigms, and does not facilitate in the ease of shifts. In order to explain such a complex phenomenon as society and human relations in social science, influential intellectual ideas translate into defining paradigms that coexist with, compete with, and sometimes complement each other.

A branch of social science, economics is "the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses"¹ In recent decades, economic reasoning has been increasingly applied to study and research of other social science disciplines such as political science, history, and psychology. Its expanding terrain has earned economics an important place in social science. Hence, this article attempts to account for paradigmatic structure in economics, so as to understand the more general patterns of continuity and changes in social science.

Two authoritative economists, John Maynard Keynes and Fredrick August Hayek both had emotion, particularly fear as a main motivator that caused them to create their respective works. A close reading of Keynes

1 Lionel Robbins, *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (London: Macmillan, 1932), 16.

and Hayek and other academics demonstrate their normative bias, for example, Keynes: to save capitalism from its booms and busts, and Hayek: to save the Western world from authoritarianism.

This paper will discuss four main ideas. First, via comparative historical analysis of economic theories, we examine if the intellectual history fits the standard of paradigm shifts. Second, through psychoanalysis, we analyze how emotion and reason can work together to produce an idea. Following this, we deliberate on Sticky Paradigms, that is, the persistence of old paradigms in the face of new ideas. Fourth, we shall conclude with a theoretical reflection on the Hegelian dialectic, treating paradigms as competing myths rather than a pragmatic competition. Throughout our analysis, we also use empirical evidence from the recent 2008 global economic meltdown to illustrate the case of sticky paradigms. Ultimately, intellectualism cannot be considered as an autonomous exercise, divorced from emotion. Rather, it is subordinated and embedded in emotion. This article will therefore attempt to make sense of the multiplicity of paradigms that enrich social science, and serve as a starting point for future discussion.

THE STRUCTURE OF PARADIGM SHIFTS

Essentially, the research question goes as follows: can we observe a clear-cut and swift pattern of paradigm shift, with regard to the evolutionary history of dominant/influential theories in economics? In this part, we will discuss some scholarly opinions on paradigm shift and offer empirics from the discipline of Economics, and International Political Economy to a lesser extent.

Thomas Kuhn is the most heard proponent of the original hypothesis that there should be an easily-distinguished line between paradigms in the intellectual history of normal science. When examining how normal science has evolved from “myths” to various science disciplines, Kuhn based his analysis upon the principles of logical positivism. Kuhn’s model of scientific change differs here, and in many places, from that of the logical positivists, in that it places an enhanced emphasis on the individual humans involved as scientists, rather than abstracting science into a purely logical or philosophical venture. Specifically, while discussing scientific

development with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein, Kuhn states:

Each of these (scientific revolutions) necessitated the community's rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another with which it was incompatible. Each produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as a transformation of the world within which scientific work was done².

Kuhn defines a scientific revolution that facilitates paradigm shift as “sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity”³. Thus, we can see that a paradigm shift from Kuhn's perspective is a breakthrough that is in resemblance with a radical revolution. Similar to Darwin's natural selection and against relativism, Kuhn considers a new paradigm to be always better than, and not just different from the old one. Any scientists who choose to go along with the old paradigm will be washed out of fashion quickly.

Paradigms are imperfect, but imperfection is a necessary evil. The enterprise of constituting a paradigm is “an attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies... those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all”⁴. In other words, that could be an inevitable “selection error” problem in the process of paradigm building, and limitations of agreement left many fascinating theoretical problems for successors to improve the match between paradigm and observation of the real world, constituting a post-paradigm period.⁵

2 Kuhn, Thomas, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (The University of Chicago Press, 1962), 6.

3 Thomas, *The Structure*, 10.

4 Thomas, *The Structure*, 24.

5 According to Kuhn: “The enterprise now under discussion has drastically restricted vision. But those restrictions, born from confidence in a paradigm, turn out to be essential to the development of science. By focusing attention upon a small range of relatively esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable. And normal science possesses

*Sticky paradigms in Social Science:
The role of emotion and ego in the case of economics*

It is these imperfections embodied in the confines of possible research questions in a particular paradigm that trigger a paradigm shift. Kuhn traces the root of a paradigm shift to the lack of novelties in an established science: “Normal science does not aim at novelties of facts or theory and, when successful, finds none. New and unsuspected phenomena are, however, repeatedly uncovered by scientific research, and radical new theories have again and again been invented by scientists”.⁶ Therefore, rejection of one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other. Meanwhile, the process is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals rather than a cumulative one because a scientific revolution should always be drastic enough to make sure that paradigmatic anomalies will penetrate existing knowledge to the core. Moreover, in describing the radical nature of a paradigm shift, Kuhn adds:

The new paradigm, or a sufficient hint to permit later articulation, emerges all at once, sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man deeply immersed in crisis... Almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change.⁷

Overall, Kuhn is against the view of science as cumulation which is “entangled with a dominant epistemology that takes knowledge to be a construction placed directly upon raw sense data by the mind”, but argues that “cumulative acquisition of novelty is not only rare in fact but improbable in principle”.⁸ From this stance, a paradigm challenger must think outside the box that is defined and confined by the traditional paradigm, in terms of ontology, epistemology, and methodology.

a built-in mechanism that ensures the relaxation of the restrictions that bound research whenever the paradigm from which they derive ceases to function effectively. At that point scientists begin to behave differently, and the nature of their research problems changes. In the interim, however, during the period when the paradigm is successful, the profession will have solved problems that its members could scarcely have imagined and would never have undertaken without commitment to the paradigm. And at least part of the achievement always proves to be permanent” (Ibid, 24-25)

6 Thomas, *The Structure*, 52.

7 Thomas, *The Structure*, 89-90.

8 Thomas, *The Structure*, 96.

If there should be a “scientific” mode of evolution of economic thoughts in accordance with Kuhn’s observation, we can draw a general picture of paradigm shifts within the field of economics. Originally, by focusing on nation-states and government’s “visible hand”, mercantilism or economic nationalism had dominated Europe and its colonies for over 250 years after the late Renaissance of the 15th century, until Adam Smith in 1776 wrote that the wealth of a nation is increased by expanding the market production rather than accumulating gold reserves through exports. In showing so, Smith initiated the Smithsonian Revolution against mercantilism in favor of classical economic liberalism. For over a century after the first industrial revolution of 1840, the law of market or Say’s law had dominated economics. Practiced and promoted by Jean Say, James Mill, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mills, this early paradigm of economics was based on principles of laissez-faire, market self-regulation, and supply-side economic policies. Subsequently, Alfred Marshall in 1870s started the marginalist revolution based on the idea of marginal utility to construct the field of economics into a more scientific and objective discipline, as brought under the name of neoclassical economics. During the Great Depression of 1929 to 1933, John Maynard Keynes and his supporters challenged the traditional view of market fundamentalism and supply-side economy and they facilitated the Keynesian revolution that raised a demand-side theory of employment and promoted government interventions as to maximize aggregate demand and countercyclical employment during economic stress. As Keynesianism waned due to its inability to prevent rampant debt crises in the 1970s, the movement of monetarism arose to challenge the paradigmatic position of the former. Developed by Milton Friedman, monetarism refutes Keynesian deficit spending, and aims to re-direct monetary policy toward controlling inflation and stabilizing money supply, instead of providing short-term employment and stimulating aggregate demand under Keynesianism. Per Kuhn, each successive paradigm should be better and represent a different worldview, with regard to substance, methods, problem-field, and standards of solution.

However, the real picture is much messier than suggested above. Paradigm changes have never been thoroughly distinct. Instead there has been a great deal of overlapping and repetition both academically and empirically. There have been, in the academic history of economics, successful endeavors of working within the “old-fashioned” paradigm while the new

one has gained intellectual prevalence. In 1791—almost two decades after Adam Smith wrote *the Wealth of Nations* (1776) signifying the birth of classical economic liberalism as the discipline's new paradigm, American Founding Father Alexander Hamilton presented *Report on the Subject of Manufacturers* to American congress. With a strong mercantilist bent, the report laid forth economic principles for the “American System” that the newly independent republic should develop and protect its manufacturing industry through tariffs, bounties, subsidies, and other government measures. His proposal gave birth to the famous argument of *Infant Industry Protection* as a modern theory of economic nationalism. Devoted to making his nation a powerful and affluent one, Hamilton wrote:

The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations, who have preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry, constitutes a more formidable obstacle, than either of those, which have been mentioned, to the introduction of the same branch into a country, in which it did not before exist. To maintain between the recent establishments of one country and the long matured establishments of another country, a competition upon equal terms, both as to quality and price, is in most cases impracticable. The disparity in the one, or in the other, or in both, must necessarily be so considerable as to forbid a successful rivalship, without the extraordinary aid and protection of government.⁹

Hamilton's affiliation with mercantilist practices was firmly based on his belief in European experience and its ability to create international competitiveness. At a time when the Smithsonian revolution was sweeping Europe and the new continent and Smith's liberal claims were publicly supported by other America's founding fathers such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, Alexander Hamilton's ideas later formed the base of the American school of economics that had influenced American society for over a century. In spite of the relative popularity of the neoclassical paradigm, mercantilism did not simply fade out and a new view of the world did not dominate in the scientific community of economics as would be suggested by Kuhn.

9 Alexander Hamilton, “Report on the Subject of Manufacturers,” (1791): Part III Point 3 Paragraph 10.

In a similar light, while Keynesian economics of aggregate demand and government intervention became the new paradigm in the 1940s, Hayek's works on defending classical liberalism did not become marginalized. Rather, his book *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) was well received throughout academia then and is still very popular. Throughout the years when Keynesianism principles waxed and waned, Hayek continued his liberalist program of constructing a free society through the invisible hand. In 1945, Hayek wrote "The Use of Knowledge in Society" and argued against a central planning economy by saying that: "it (the price system) fulfills less perfectly as prices grow more rigid".¹⁰ In 1976, Hayek wrote *Denationalization of Money*, advocating a free market in money as a solution to stop inflation and suggesting that "government should be deprived of its monopoly of the issue of money".¹¹ Later, this book was made the cornerstone of the Austrian free banking school of the 20th century that aspires to limit the power of central banks and enlarge that of private commercial banks. As a productive economist, Hayek has undertaken various projects during his lifetime. All his works seemed to carry some sort of paradigmatic coherence in that his research was always based on his firm position on classical liberalism. One step beyond, his research carried a human dimension, a combination of passion, life experiences, and courage to go against the tide. In the next section, we will synthesize these factors of human dimension as independent variables to explain the stickiness of paradigm and the impracticality of a paradigm shift in social science, especially, in economics.

Furthermore, through carefully examining the practical application of both Keynes' and Hayek's economic thoughts, we observe an iterative instead of progressive pattern. For example, Keynes' demand-side economic policy with a role for government (fiscal policy) and central bank (monetary policy) was widely adopted in the late 1930s after *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (1936). After major capitalist economies had implemented Keynesian macroeconomic policies of short-term aggregate demand to stimulate sufficient employment for three decades, Keynes' legacy started to wane in the late 1960s as major economies ran

10 F.A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society", *The American Economic Review*, Vol.35, No. 4 (September 1945): 526.

11 F.A. Hayek, *Denationalization of Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Currencies* (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976), 13.

into stagflation and Latin American and African countries were bogged down in prolonged sovereign debt crises. Swiftly, it was from the 1970s when Hayek's promotion of free market spirit and minimal government intervention gained a new lease of life: both traditional and emerging capitalist economies began to follow a neoliberal model that prescribes trade liberalization, privatization, macroeconomic prudence, and democratic capitalism. For example, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, Hayek's defense of a free banking system that allows for free competition among major currencies and for banks' fractional reserves "coincided" with the emergence of the Jamaica Accords of 1976 that legitimized a floating exchange rate system and strengthened Special Drawing Rights at the International Monetary Fund.

More recently, a parallel trend of paradigmatic applications in International Political Economy has emerged, during which competing schools thought have been employed simultaneously to explain the same event, be it financial crisis, development, international trade, or more broadly, economic globalization. For instance, "international laissez-faire and revisionist Keynesianism",¹² per economists Razin and Rosefelde (2011) were twin causes of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. On the one hand, market fundamentalism and "laissez-faire" placed the government's emphasis on enhancing competitive efficiency, financial globalization, and trade liberalization. On the other hand, scholars of revisionist Keynesianism, notably Phillips and Samuelson, have, since the 1950s, promoted a budget strategy that "full employment could only be maintained with 'excess' monetary and/or fiscal stimulation accompanied by inflationary side-effects...(and) any deficit spending which benefited them (politicians) and their constituents would stimulate aggregate economic activity and employment".¹³ While international laissez-faire leads to a volatile and often fragile international market, revisionist Keynesianism has created an incredible national debt for the United States and a too-big-to-fail mentality. In this case, both the Keynesian and the Hayekian "paradigms" possess a reasonable amount of explaining power and neither opinion is sufficient enough to account for the current complex state of affairs.

12 Assaf Razin and Steven Rosefelde, "Currency and Financial Crises of the 1990's and 2000's," *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 16754*, (2011):597.

13 Razin and Rosefelde, "Currency," 513.

To conclude this section, we refute Kuhn's ideas by arguing that a determined paradigm shift will not be the case in social science such as economics. Instead, we find that paradigms are sticky! All in all, social science diverges from natural science in the former's inherent tendency of value relevance and we ought to understand paradigms in social science in a more philosophical and humane way.¹⁴ In the next section, we attempt to construct a causal link between emotion (mainly fear) and the persistence of different economic paradigms.

FEAR AS THE X FACTOR: ECONOMICS, REASON AND THE HUMAN CONDITION

It is commonly thought that reason and emotion are two parallel lines considered dichotomous since the time of Plato.¹⁵ In *Phaedrus*, Plato writes that reason is the horse that leads to salvation, whereas the road of emotion is one of lust and destruction. He created this seemingly true, yet false dichotomy as a learning tool, a mythos for conceptual purposes. In another work, *Philebus*, he continues this work albeit in a different fashion. Here, emotion is perceived as a complement to reason.¹⁶ Both reason and emotion are two parts that compose the intellectual process. In this

14 Academically, there are always prominent scholars producing remarkable works along the line of "obsolete" paradigms. Empirically, different paradigms coexist to explain and provide remedies to the same socioeconomic event. Maybe we can stop by asserting that diversity is beautiful but the reasoning of why paradigms are sticky should go much deeper than this. Firstly, social science are qualitatively different from natural science. Although both can advance by abstraction and generalization, Max Weber argued that differences between natural and social science lie in the cognitive intentions of the researcher and that social scientists make "value relevant" choices of the human actors and actions they wish to explore. Also, based on the theory of empirical falsification, the great science philosopher Karl Popper adopted a "conjecturalism" stance against scientism that "all scientific knowledge is conjectural... due to an asymmetry between verification and falsification" (Artigas 1997, 5). Popper was joined by his lifelong friend F.A. Hayek in the objection of scientism: "the danger is now the opposite one of the predominance of scientism impeding the progress of the understanding of society." (Hayek 1952, 17). The danger of scientism, per Hayek is thus to treat men mechanically. While criticizing neoclassical economics, John Kenneth Galbraith denoted "imitative scientism" to the mainstream economics and suggested a more blurry line between normative and positive economics.

15 V J. McGill, *Emotion and Reason* (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1954), xii.

16 McGill, *Emotion*, viii.

section, we will define these two faculties separately and discuss how they function together to define the competing paradigms that have come to explain modern economics. These very faculties make up our nature; it expresses humanity and the essence of our existence.

Emotions are universal: human beings are linked by this metaphysical substance. They are a vital part of the human experience; inseparable from the human condition however varied the historical context.¹⁷ Emotions can be defined as

...a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated through neural and/or hormonal systems, which gives rise to feelings (affective experiences as of pleasure or displeasure) and also general cognitive processes toward appraising the experience; emotions in this sense lead to physiological adjustments to the conditions that aroused response, and often to expressive and adaptive behavior.¹⁸

As human entities, due to the simple biological functioning of our bodies, we, our perception and our environment, are all products of our emotions. These emotions respond to a perceived understanding of a reality and will lead to behavior that individuals may not have control over. Fear of given societal problems, economic instability and its consequences for example, will lead to a response that may be calculated using reason and intellect. Fear is one of the many basic, fundamental emotions which forms the X favor seemingly ignored or superficially forgotten by Economics. From this definition, we understand that fear, an emotion, plays an important role in the decision-making process. It shapes intellectual pursuits and is a significant part of being human.

In Politics, Aristotle argues that emotions are one of two variables needed to make sound moral, political decisions. He states: "...those who investigate politics must study the nature of the soul, in so far as the object of

17 Goodwin, J, J.M Jasper, and F. Polleta. *Passionate Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 10.

18 Paul R. Kleinginna Jr., and Ann M. Kleinginna. "A Categorized List of Emotion Definitions, with Suggestions for a Consensual Definition," *Motivation and Emotion*, 5 (1981):345.

his inquiry aids political understanding”¹⁹ He creates the concept of *symphonia* to describe the relationship between emotion and reason. Thus, an understanding of emotion is a prerequisite for an understanding of politics.

Reason must also be explained to understand the role of emotion in the decision making process. Put simply, reason is the ability to think clearly to solve issues and achieve goals. This is linked to rationality which denotes achieving the best gains given limited means.²⁰ This is an important assumption of Economics. In Economics, people are anticipated to be rational beings in that they make choices based on a ranked order of preferences, calculating the costs and benefits of actions needed to achieve their goals.

Interestingly, reason and rationality are used interchangeably in social science. However, they are meant to be qualitatively different concepts.²¹ The term reason has been hijacked by rational choice theorists, their epistemology and methodology of choice. This erodes the actual meaning of the concept as one that attempts to solve issues using logic. Epistemologically, reason does not denote some objective truth separated from human interference; for there is nothing more human than feeling emotion.^{22,23} It is only assumed that the choices of our rational deliberations are human goals; the emotional aspect and the subject of investigation. However, such rational determination, for the sake of simplification, casts aside the emotional aspect that limits the range of choices available to the subject. The range of choices available is a product of the person’s emotional needs perceived as important to the subject in question. Using the two terms (reason and rationality) interchangeably erodes and confuses its actual meaning. Simplification that casts emotion aside for analytical purposes may have led to the dichotomization of emotion and reason, even when Aristotle meant them to be used in conjunction.

19 Marlene K. Sokolon, *Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 2006), 5.

20 Sokolon, *Political Emotions*, 12.

21 McGill, *Emotion and Reason*, viii.

22 McGill, *Emotion and Reason*, 9.

23 Pascal said “the heart has its own reasons” meaning that emotions have rational motivations and goals.

*Sticky paradigms in Social Science:
The role of emotion and ego in the case of economics*

Together, it can be argued that reason and emotion work together "...in the process of judging external events and motivating human social and ethical action".^{24,25} Aristotle himself combines the two in *Nicomachean Ethics*, referring to the temperate person as someone who has "his appetites in symphony with his reason".²⁶ Ultimately, the intellectual consists of these two parts that combine to make him/her human; there is no escape from this fact, and no methodology can separate an academic from his/her passion, motivation and reason for being. In this sense, we challenge academics to consider their emotion before and during their intellectual process. Emotions, especially fear, are key elements in determining our goals and objectives.

Many argue, erroneously, that Economics is an emotionless, positivist and amoral subject of inquiry. This could not be further from the truth. We submit that Economics is a field defined by normative and moral principles constructed by emotions, specifically fear as the X factor. Normative commitments are determined by an expressed need, driven by fear, to save the world from a perceived evil. The field of Economics best describes the articulated drive that designates an evil and advocates methods to protect and preserve society. This is best illustrated by the examining the normative beliefs and goals of the founders of Economics. Adam Smith began the scientific study of Economics but not without his normative roots. He wanted to see a society that could operate free from the heavy hand of government; that every man would have the freedom to conduct himself in his own self-interest. Karl Marx, another economist, albeit a radical, vied for the elimination of private property for the emancipation of the proletariat, a term that is inherently emotional. Keynes and Hayek also had their normative beliefs that shaped their dogma. Here, we see an example of how reason and emotion are combined to create seemingly unmovable paradigms.

24 Sokolon, *Political Emotions*, 4.

25 Consider Antonio Damasio's study on the effects of brain damage to the ventromedial prefrontal region, the part of the brain associated with emotional response, more specifically, the area with the ability to think long-term and follow social rules (Sokolon, 41). If this area fails to function normally, then one would behave in a socially unacceptable way. Decision-making is thus impeded as optimal decisions can no longer be made.

26 Sokolon, *Political Emotions*, 13.

Keynes' career was renowned for his foresight and his proclivity for choosing the lesser of two evils. After World War I, he objected to the Versailles Treaty. In his book *The Economic Consequences of Peace* (1919), he argues large-scale reparations would harm Germany. He knew that the treaty would spawn greater discord. It is in this pragmatic orientation that Keynes wrote the *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936). Prior to these tumultuous times, laissez faire economics were the dominant prescriptions.²⁷ After the Great Depression of 1929, it became clear to Keynes that the laissez-faire system had its faults. To Keynes, the goal was to create a managed form of capitalism to ensure stability. In "The End of Laissez-faire" he writes:

Many people, who are really objecting to capitalism as a way of life, argue as though they were objecting to it on the grounds of its inefficiency in attaining its own goals...Nevertheless, a time may be coming when we shall get clearer than at present as to when we are talking about capitalism as an efficient or inefficient technique, and when we are talking about it as desirable or objectionable in itself. For my part I think capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient for attaining economic ends than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in itself it is in many ways extremely objectionable. Our problem is to work out a social organization which shall be as efficient as possible without offending our notions of a satisfactory way of life.²⁸

Here, Keynes wanted to create a more stable and sustainable form of capitalism that was not subject to drastic and unexpected booms and busts

27 This meant that the government was to take a 'hands off' approach; let the free market lead and this would benefit humanity. This idea was forwarded by Adam Smith. He professed that only unregulated economic markets are the most efficient; government had no role to play in business and the production of goods and services. Smith argues: "Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." The government had to create the atmosphere for investment and let individual self-interest flow. This self-interest is the major contributor to this efficiency. If everyone produced what they knew best then this was beneficial for the community. Smith continues: "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer and the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest."

28 John Maynard Keynes, *The End of Laissez-Faire* (London: MacMillan, 1926), 293.

*Sticky paradigms in Social Science:
The role of emotion and ego in the case of economics*

cycles that would lead persons to turn to radical political alternatives, like Communism. Ultimately, Keynes argues that since the world suffered from the unfettered market, it was the duty of governments to step in and create full employment. Full employment brings about a content population and would ultimately discourage alternative movements. Keynesianism became acceptable because the Soviet Union had full employment, a strong working class and a stable economy; three attributes a Liberal Economy lacked during long periods of depression. Thus, Keynesianism was a compromise to maintain a western liberal economic society to prevent the spread of communism.²⁹ Thus, he wrote his general theory with this purpose in mind:

The purpose of the book as a whole may be described as the establishment of an anti-Marxian socialism, a reaction against *laissez-faire* built on theoretical foundations totally unlike those of Marx in being based on a repudiation instead of on an acceptance of the classical hypotheses, and on an unfettering of competition instead of its abolition.³⁰

As can be seen here, Keynes' ultimate desire was to create a more sustainable form of capitalism, one that was friendly to the acquisition of wealth for the benefit of society. His theories came from his ethical, political ideological commitments, driven by an expressed fear of communism, to make capitalism better against this alternative. Hayek saw this as inherently bad and responded to Keynes with his own work.

The Road to Serfdom (1944) describes the normative underpinnings of Hayek. His life experiences dictated his opinion on Keynesianism and other forms of central planning. He writes on the dangers of following such policies knowing the potential for history to repeat itself:

The author has spent about half of his adult life in his native Austria, in close touch with German intellectual life, and the other half in the United States and England. In the dozen years in which this country has now become his home he has become increasingly convinced that at least some of the forces which have destroyed free-

29 John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1936), 384.

30 Keynes, *The General Theory*, 355.

dom in Germany are also at work here, and that the character and the source of this danger are, if possible, even less understood than they were in Germany. The supreme tragedy is still not seen that in Germany it was largely people of goodwill, men who were admired and held up as models in this country, who prepared the way, if they did not actually create, the forces which now stand for everything they detest.³¹

According to Hayek, the dangers of sliding into totalitarianism were not unique to Fascism and Nazism, but rather to any attempt to place centralized authority into the hands of a few. He writes:

Few are ready to recognise that the rise of Fascism and Nazism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preceding period, but a necessary outcome of those tendencies. This is a truth which most people were unwilling to see even when the similarities of many of the repellent features of the internal regimes in communist Russia and national-socialist Germany were widely recognised. As a result, many who think themselves infinitely superior to the aberrations of Nazism and sincerely hate all its manifestations, work at the same time for ideals whose realisation would lead straight to the abhorred tyranny.³²

This quote establishes Hayek's normative motivation driven by the emotion of fear: that both Fascism and Nazism were not born as a response to socialism, but because of a fundamental authoritarian nature predicated by the need to control. Those who purport any form of centralized planning would therefore undercut man's natural right to govern. The potential for tyranny is too great; the distance from a democratic government toward authoritarian government is not a great one. He continues further:

Have not the parties of the Left as well as those of the Right been deceived by believing that the National Socialist Party was in the service of the capitalists and opposed to all forms of socialism? How many features of Hitler's system have not been recommended to us for imitation from the most unexpected quarters, unaware that they are an integral part of that system and incompatible with the free

31 F.A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 3.

32 Hayek, *Road*, 4.

society we hope to preserve? The number of dangerous mistakes we have made before and since the outbreak of war because we do not understand the opponent with whom we are faced is appalling. It seems almost as if we did not want to understand the development which has produced totalitarianism because such an understanding might destroy some of the dearest illusions to which we are determined to cling.³³

To Hayek, centralized planning is fundamentally discordant with a free and democratic society. Too much power would be placed in the hands of the few. Thus, any attempt to pursue the Keynesian way would essentially lead to the dissolution of the society many seek to preserve through government intervention. Hence, Hayek responds to Keynes not simply in a positivist way, but rather, through the acknowledgement of a normative foundation that must not be denied.

From these examples, we see how reason and emotional aspects of our being interact and work together to create and establish ideas and paradigms. This provides firm ground for our hypotheses and the reasons for Sticky Paradigms in economics. Economics is quite the emotional subject. Who gets what is a very emotional task as there will always be winners and losers to every economic decision due to scarcity. The next section will discuss the Freudian concept of the ego and its role in the inflexibility of intellectualism. Emotion creates ideas and ego continues the dialectic. Ultimately, these two intellectuals were stubborn, not solely because of their positivist conviction, but because their inherently different, morally based positions, desired to prevent a greater evil combined with ego. Academics may die but ideas never die; and academics stick to their guns.

STICKY PARADIGMS DEFINED

So far, this argument illustrates how ideas are created as a product of emotion and reason. However, how does a paradigm stick? The ego plays a substantial role as part of the emotional institution in hindering paradigm shifts. Here, we introduce the subject of psychoanalysis.

Using the structural model of the mind theory of Sigmund Freud, we will discuss how ideas are developed in the mind. This will be done using his

³³ Hayek, *Road*, 6.

holistic theory of psychic structure that makes up the human mind.³⁴ There are three parts to this theory: the id, the ego and the superego. The id is the unconscious and the instinctual; that which what is programmed within us from since birth³⁵ It is a primitive aspect of the psyche that consists of aggressive and sexual, animalistic behavior.³⁶ It forms the mechanism for self-preservation and motivation. The ego and the superego are partly conscious.³⁷ The ego has a multiplicity of functions that involve rational thought, for example, perceptions, cognition, judgment and decision-making. It forms a bridge between the internal, our mind, and the external, the world and between the id and the superego.³⁸ It is developed by experiences with the outside world. Thus, the ego mediates between the unconscious and the conscious.³⁹ The superego forms the moral base of this tripartite theory and acts as a check on the id, ensuring that we behave in a socially acceptable manner. It places a demand upon the ego to act, not solely in a rational way, but in an empathetic and moral way.⁴⁰ With this structural model of the mind, how does this structure create ideas? Further, how does this relate to our main hypothesis, how emotion and reason create ideas?

To answer these questions, is it important to note that these three facets, the id, the ego and the superego, all make up the fundamental structure of the human mind. From our study, we submit that human behavior is regulated by this structure. Therefore, it is logical to argue that this structure governs human thought and rationality. To repeat, the human mind sits in the middle of a biological need to self-preserve (the id) and a simultaneous need to be acceptable to society (the superego). The ego stands in between these two, forming a compromise. The intellectual, if we assume he is human, is subject to these same anchors. Fundamentally, his or her ideas are formulated by the id and the superego, the need to self-preserve

34 Gertrude Blanck and Rubin Blanck, *Ego Psychology: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 12.

35 Blanck and Blanck, *Ego Psychology*, 5.

36 Jacob A. Arlow, "The Structural Model," in *Textbook of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Richard G. Kopff and Edward Nersessian (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996), 63.

37 Blanck and Blanck, *Ego Psychology*, 5.

38 Arlow, "Structural Model," 61.

39 Stephen Frosh, *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 73.

40 Frosh, *Brief Introduction*, 74.

and the need to be acceptable to society. Hence, ideas are articulated by these forces. Both Keynes and Hayek wanted to create a theory to preserve what they thought was a good society. They also wanted their ideas to flourish and become popular, or as Machiavelli would say, “have the ear of the Prince.” They expressed this need through their training: Economics.

Moreover, it is important to analyze how they react to those that accept and reject their intellectuality. Since the ego is developed by the interaction between the id and the superego, then it will be impacted by outside criticism. In turn, the ego, with the id and superego would respond. First, focusing on the id, the unconscious part of the psyche is always active, perpetually seeking satisfaction.⁴¹ This forms the crux of self-protection, the basic and automatic response to a threat.⁴² Many psychoanalysts deal with internal threats, a traumatic memory for example. Instead, I would like to focus on outside threats, such as the replacement of paradigms. No scholar would like to see their paradigm destroyed for some other equation which is why scholars defend their positions vociferously. Here, we must focus on the emotional attachment to that paradigm, instead of the paradigm itself. The ego’s defense mechanisms protect the paradigm from destruction. The ego has the ability to find solutions to attack which explains the stickiness of paradigms. This has been illustrated in the beginning of this paper with the discussion of continued and simultaneous existence of certain schools of economic thought or paradigms.

Heinz Hartmann goes into greater detail. He purports that the ego possesses elements such as defense and adaptation especially since it has to reconcile the needs of the id with the needs of the superego.⁴³ Focusing on defense, the ego has the ability to respond to attack. Using its capability to rationalize, the ego can find a plethora of solutions to these attacks. Thus, the ego, the part of the mind that rationalizes, will use its power to give reason for the failure of the paradigm. It will find the evidence it needs to prevent the paradigm from sinking into a perceived oblivion, fulfilling the superego’s need to become socially acceptable again.

41 Frosh, *Brief Introduction*, 9.

42 Frosh, *Brief Introduction*, 56.

43 Blanck and Blanck, *Ego Psychology*, 19.

This Freudian investigation is interested in the dark recesses of the mind. Every man, woman and child in existence is subjected to their personality and within that personality lays this very structure. This structure impacts the way a person thinks and functions in society and also in academia. Academics, contrary to their self-perception, are just like everyone else. Moreover, there are no methodologies that exist today that can separate the individual from their psyche. This line of thought is related to the Neo-Gramscian assumption that dictates that: “No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from the fact of his involvement with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of society”.⁴⁴

HEGEL’S DIALECTIC IN EXPLAINING STICKY PARADIGMS

In the previous sections, we have employed examples jointly with an Aristotelian framework on human emotion and a Freudian investigation on mind structure. In this last part, we contrive to synthesize our analyses into a philosophical “super-structure”, using the logic of idealistic dialectic.

German philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel, in his works on the science of logic as part of *the 1830 Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Science* introduced a comprehensive architecture to accommodate the developments of science, art, history, religion, and even our existence in the universe. Based on Hegel’s reasoning, contradictions and oppositions are inherent to people’s minds: these tensions coexist by proving each other wrong in the negation of negation and together they constitute Hegel’s essential thinking of dialectic. Hegel defined his idealist dialectic:

In its true and proper character, Dialectic is the very nature and essence of everything predicated by the mere understanding--- the law of things and of the finite as a whole... by Dialectic is meant the indwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen as in its true light, and shown to be the negation of them.⁴⁵

44 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1978), 10.

45 William Wallace, *Hegel’s Philosophy of mind / Tr. from the Encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences, with five introductory essays* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894), 116.

*Sticky paradigms in Social Science:
The role of emotion and ego in the case of economics*

In other words, Hegel saw everything surrounding us as an instance of Dialectic, which constantly transforms into its opposite. Everything has two sides: positive and negative; they are united and made part of its nature. For example, in Hegel's view, living and dying are two interchangeable forms of life; being and nothing are integrated as becoming; extreme anarchy and extreme despotism naturally lead to one another.

Hegel further constructed a three-step model of development to explain the indefinite nature of everything: the emergence of a thesis will automatically give rise to an antithesis; tensions between the thesis and the antithesis are resolved into a synthesis. To shed light on the evolution of science, such a synthesis signifies the existence of a discipline while both the thesis and the antithesis are differing schools or paradigms within the discipline. To emphasize, Hegel stressed that the development of a true science should be cumulative, dialectical and ultimately infinite:

An infinite system of true propositions free of logical contradiction (a comprehensive consistent system of knowledge) is approached by logically contradictory statements in the world. In part by such contradiction in the history of knowledge, such science is gradually, dialectically constructed. The systematic truth is essentially a result.⁴⁶

Moreover, through the Doctrine of Dialectic, Hegel in fact conveyed the thought of "negation of the negation" as the center of infinite thinking. The underlying logic is: the one side of a science is an indirect proof whose contradictoriness implies the truth of the negative side and vice versa. To connect this logic to Hegelian dialectic, one can argue: "The notion of the infinite is the negation of the negation, affirmation, being which has restored itself out of limitedness... It is the very nature of the finite to transcend itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite".⁴⁷

Various schools of economic thought, acting as relational parts are integrated into the whole of Economics, as a general field of inquiry. Keynes'

46 Clark Butler, *Hegel's Logic: Between Dialectic and History* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 70-1.

47 John N. Findlay, "Comment on Hegel's Dialectic of the Organic Whole," in *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, ed. Warren Steinkraus and Kenneth Schmitz (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), 267.

avocation of government intervention co-exists with Hayek's claim for free market economy in a dialectical way without eliminating each pole. It has the potential to consider the existence of emotion and the ego as it creates room for negotiation as represented by synthesis. Moreover, emotion and reason work in unity by negating or invalidating one another in the fashion of negation of the negation. Together, they constitute the mental basis of intellectual self-soothing.

Further, the ego operates in-tandem with the id and the superego to explain our attachment to ideas. Intellectualism and paradigms are unable to change or shift because of the structure of the human psyche. It is in this sense that academic exercises, such as this one, cannot be considered pure science; being human erodes this. Paradigms are not simply an objective theory created by the rational individual. The idea is contaminated by the very mind that conceived it. This is because of the psyche. Therefore, human beings are not quite the rational beings. Rather, 'rationality' must be seen as an equation that includes not simply reason, but the id and the superego. Our primal instincts combined with our need to be acceptable to society will inevitably destroy the very idea we hope to convey. Thus, combining reason with emotion, paradigms become mythical.

Myths are constructed to "inspire people to act and create reality".⁴⁸ According to George Sorel, Marxism, for example is a myth in that it does not have to be factual: it simply serves as a rallying cry to convince the working class to act. Myths need not be rooted in truth, only emotion; they are not "descriptions of things, but determinations to act".⁴⁹ Since emotion is involved, myths cannot be easily destroyed. Sorel illustrates this: "A myth cannot be refuted, since it is, at bottom, identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the language of movement..."⁵⁰ Here, politics and struggle are not based upon fact or rationality, but are instead rooted in terms of emotion and lies for the purpose of survival. A scholar's determination to preserve his/her ideas emerges from a need to be accepted by the academic community. This is the philosophical essence of Sticky Paradigms. It provides a more

48 Carl Cohen, *Communism, Fascism and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations* (New York: Random House, 1967), 320.

49 Cohen, *Communism*, 320.

50 Cohen, *Communism*, 324.

profound explanation for the existence of multiple paradigms. Economic theories are thus formed; it is the mythos of academia.

Through our careful examination on the relationship between and among different paradigms in the history of Economics, we notice that the hypothesis of paradigm shifts does not hold for the development of social science; instead, “old” paradigms stick via the normative commitment as well as the psychological persistence of the great minds behind them.

CONCLUSION

We are puzzled by a big question: what explains progress in social science? Taking on the science of Economics, we hypothesize that it is emotion that renders a multiplicity of paradigms in harmony with each other. In order to validate our hypothesis, we approach the research question with a hierarchical structure of four layers. Firstly, we document a historical review of the evolution of economics from Smith to Friedman, with emphases on the works of Keynes and Hayek, as two representing paradigms. In doing so, we demonstrate both intellectually and empirically that different paradigms operate in parallel simultaneously, rather than at different times. On one hand, not a single school of thought can occupy the whole of Economics, even at its height of dominance. On the other hand, different paradigms are often used in cooperation to explain complex real-world events, such as financial instability and economic governance.

Secondly, we follow Aristotle’s reasoning on emotion and reason to explain the persistence of different paradigms at one time in Economics, both aimed at improving capitalism. Keynes and Hayek grounded their ideas in differing normative orientations based on their personal experience. Struck by the miseries of the Great Depression and worries about the advent of communism, Keynes decided that proper government intervention is necessary to save capitalism from self-destruction; while burdened by a centralized economy and troubled by its tendency to lead to authoritarian control, Hayek insisted that a free economy is essential to a free society. In both cases, emotion, in close relation with reason accounts for their different gestures.

Thirdly, we utilize the structural theory of Sigmund Freud to define the inertia of paradigms. Specifically, the id-ego-superego framework is used to

illustrate why paradigms do not shift in a clear fashion. It is the normative commitment of each representing scholar to making the capitalist economy better that constitutes sticky paradigms. Additionally, the inability to shift also emerges from scholars' personal attachments to their theories.

Lastly, we distil our analyses with a philosophical focus. Hegelian dialectic is applied to our hypothesis of sticky paradigms. Economics, as every other science, is an infinite essence of being that is made up of opposing parts, and thus is dialectically constructed. Economics, or broadly social science, manifests itself in a set of contradictions, but it ultimately integrates without reducing one to the other.

Certainly, the intellectual history of social science is far from closed. Our project serves as a detailed account of the complexity and sophistication of social science. As scholars, we cannot be free from all worldly weights, demands, requirements, and pressures. However, we must attempt to fully pursue creative, innovation and unconventional thinking.

WORKS CITED

- Robbins, Lionel. *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*. London: Macmillan, 1932.
- Arlow, Jacob, A. "The Structural Model" *Textbook of Psychoanalysis* ed. Richard G Kopff and Edward Nersessian. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996
- Artigas, Mariano. "The Ethical Roots of Karl Popper's Epistemology". *Unpublished text*, July 1997.
- Blanck, Gertrude and Blanck Rubin. *Ego Psychology: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- Butler, Clark. *Hegel's Logic: Between Dialectic and History*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1996.
- Cohen, Carl. *Communism, Fascism and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations*. New York: Random House, 1967.
- Findlay, John N. "Comment on Hegel's Dialectic of the Organic Whole." In *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, edited by Warren Steinkraus and Kenneth Schmitz, 233-37. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980.
- Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Goodwin, J, J.M Jasper, and F. Polleta. *Passionate Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- Griswold, Charles, L, Jr. "Adam Smith" *Political Philosophy* ed. Steven M. Cahn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005
- Hamilton, Alexander. "Report on the Subject of Manufacturers". Communicated to the House of Representatives, December 5, 1791.
- Hayek, F.A. *The Road to Serfdom*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Hayek, F.A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1945): 519-530.
- Hayek, F.A. *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason*. Free Press, 1952.
- Hayek, F.A. *Denationalization of Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Currencies*. The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976.
- Keynes, John Maynard. *The Economic Consequences of Peace*. London: MacMillan, 1919.
- Keynes, John Maynard. *The End of Laissez-Faire*. London: MacMillan, 1926.

- Keynes, John Maynard. *The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1936.
- Kleinginna, Paul, R Jr., and Kleinginna, Anne, M. "A Categorized List of Emotion Definitions, with Suggestions for a Consensual Definition," *Motivation and Emotion*, 5 (1981): 345-79.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.
- McGill, V. J. *Emotion and Reason*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1954.
- Razin, Assaf and Steven Rosefelde. "Currency & Financial Crises of the 1990's and 2000's," *National Bureau of Economic Research*, Working Paper 16754 (2011):499-530.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Random House, 1978.
- Smith, Adam. "The Wealth of Nations." In *Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts*, edited by Steven M. Cahn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Sokolon, Marlene, K. *Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 2006.
- Stearns, Peter N. and Carol Z. Stearns. "Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards." *The American Historical Review* Vol. 90, No. 4 (1985): 813-83.
- William Wallace. *Hegel's Philosophy of mind / Tr. from the Encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences, with five introductory essays*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894.